Gregory Rapawy <grapawy at yahoo.com> writes: > --- David Dyer-Bennet <dd-b at dd-b.net> wrote: > > Gregory Rapawy <grapawy at yahoo.com> writes: > [...] > >> I think that in certain areas of debate the > strength > >> of the participants' beliefs in certain emotional > >> (or, perhaps, value) propositions is relevant to > the > >> truth they are seeking to ascertain. Examples > >> include political philosophy, rhetoric, and > >> aesthetics. > > Well, for your particular benefit, I will disagree > > *passionately* and *vehemently* with this position. > > Maybe it'll help, who knows? > > It will certainly have the effect of keeping the two > of us interested in the conversation, although this > may not promote the common welfare if everyone else on > the list gets bored. > > > To me, these are precisely the subjects that *must* > > be considered rationally and not emotionally. > > What is the source of that obligation? Arriving at the truth, of course. > >> First, in political philosophy, the strengths of > our > >> beliefs in certain propositions of value are, at > >> least within some methodologies, the raw data from > >> which we construct theories of the good or the > >> right. > [...] > > Statistically, how strongly people feel about > > something is relevant to policy certainly. I see > > that as completely unrelated to the act of debate, > > though. > > Probably the only way to approach this point is with > specific examples. That is dangerous, because there > is some chance of getting sidetracked onto the merits > of the political issue, and to make the point well I > need to use an issue about which people have strong > feelings. I don't see this example relating to your argument; it's certainly an example of an argument where the positions are passionate, but if any thing it's a poster child for how pointless that is. If the positions are *passionate* rather than *rational*, intellectual discussion will not arrive at anything much useful. > >> Second, in rhetoric, the goal is to find the > >> argument that the ultimate listeners (not the > >> present companion with whom one is having the > >> intellectual debate about rhetoric) will find > >> persuasive, which will almost certainly depend on > >> the strength of their beliefs in various > >> propositions. > [...] > > Rhetoric is in direct opposition to intellectual > > debate; rhetoric is the attempt to *convince* by > > tactical trickery. Intellectual debate is the > > attempt to *demonstrate* by *logic*. > > Thus the distinction I drew between ultimate listeners > and present companion. That is, you (present > companion) and I can discuss intellectually whether > the crowd to whom I will speak tomorrow (ultimate > listeners) will find one tactic or another persuasive. > You can demonstrate to me logically that one tactic > is persuasive, or another unpersuasive. Indeed, you > do me a disservice if you *persuade* me that a certain > tactic will be persuasive when in fact it will not. > > But in making your demonstration, you are likely to > draw on our shared intuitions and emotions. You might > draw on those we share with the crowd; or on those > that you share with the crowd and I do not, or vice > versa; or even on those that we share but the crowd > does not. Each has its uses. Sure; this seems just like what I was thinking on this part. > [...] > > If one attempts to make an axiomatic formal system > of > > aesthetics one could have intellectual debates with > > it, but they'd have little to do with how anybody > > liked a piece of art. > > I am, as I said, not a student of aesthetics. But > have you really never had the experience of discussing > intellectually whether a certain work of art was good > or bad, and why? It doesn't require an axiomatic > formal system. Nor is it wholly divorced from > intuitions, feelings, and emotions. Rather, it is an > attempt to make some sense of one's feelings, pro or > con, by comparisons between different works of art, > and an attempt to draw principles from one's > impressions. Sometimes it may lead to a subjective > reassessment of the work. ("Oh -- I hadn't thought of > it that way. Maybe the artist *was* trying to do > that. That's interesting.") Well, you can rationalize why you feel the way you do. That seems to me what it always comes down to. -- David Dyer-Bennet, dd-b at dd-b.net / New TMDA anti-spam in test John Dyer-Bennet 1915-2002 Memorial Site http://john.dyer-bennet.net Book log: http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/Ouroboros/booknotes/ New Dragaera mailing lists, see http://dragaera.info