At 3:46 PM -0400 8/19/02, Gaertk at aol.com wrote: >David Dyer-Bennet <dd-b at dd-b.net> writes: > >> Gregory Rapawy <grapawy at yahoo.com> writes: >> >>> Taking your broader claim ("*How much* somebody cares >>> about something *in an intellectual debate* is >>> completely irrelevant, except tactically."), I think >>> that in certain areas of debate the strength of the >>> participants' beliefs in certain emotional (or, >>> perhaps, value) propositions is relevant to the truth >>> they are seeking to ascertain. ÝExamples include >>> political philosophy, rhetoric, and aesthetics. >> >> Well, for your particular benefit, I will disagree >> *passionately* and *vehemently* with this position. ÝMaybe >> it'll help, who knows? > >I'm with you, David. The more passionate someone is, the >less attention I pay to their claims; anyone who can't stop >ranting goes straight to my killfile. Lurk a while on >rec.arts.sf.written for reasons why I do this; the thread >with "Iraq" in the subject is probably a good place to start. I _like_ rants. I admire well writen ones. I go on them myself (as David will testify). Indeed, I think they serve useful rhetorical purposes. Mistaking a rant for a constructive argument, by either party, leads to miscommunication. But anger, moral outrage, despair, and agony are part of many important issues. I think that the argument that emotion leads to flawed arguments isn't true. I think that many people substitute emotion for logic, and that many people mistake emotion for reasoned argument. In my opinion, a good argument has both a sufficient emotional component as to give it weight and meaning and carefully reasoned argumentation, and clear distinctions between the two. -- Lydy Nickerson lydy at demesne.com lydy at lydy.com Dulciculi Aliquorum