Matthew Hunter <matthew at infodancer.org> writes: > OK, here we have to fork the argument. > > Either 1) you actually mean omnipotent, or 2) you mean > omniscient. Now, an omnipotent God could conceivably design a > world that included free will and so on, but didn't allow anyone > to commit evil acts. An omniscient God would presumably know the > consequences of all his acts, and thus would responsible for > later actions exactly as if setting up a stack of dominoes to > topple. > > The counterargument to both forks remains the same: free will. > If omniscient, then God may know the results of his actions, but > he is not making our choices for us. We choose to do good or > evil, and foreknowledge of that choice does not equate to a lack > of choice. If omnipotent, then by removing the consequences of > evil choices from the world, God would be negating the > significance of free will. If there are no consequences to evil > acts, than why does it matter whether you choose good or evil? > Thus, an omnipotent God cannot logically protect us from evil > acts, freely chosen, without removing our free will in > practical, if not theoretical, terms. So, are you arguing that we have to be *this* weak a vessel to have free will? That we're as morally strong as is possibly compatible with any free will, pushed right up to the edge? And I think your argument about consequences is backwards -- if the consequences of evil acts are why they're bad, then what's this assertion of morality all about? That "evil" is what it is because it hurts people is *my* position. -- David Dyer-Bennet, dd-b at dd-b.net / http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/ John Dyer-Bennet 1915-2002 Memorial Site http://john.dyer-bennet.net Dragaera mailing lists, see http://dragaera.info