Steve Simmons wrote: >On Mon, Feb 07, 2005 at 02:38:00PM -0700, Jeff G. wrote: > > > >>From: "Philip Hart" <philiph at slac.stanford.edu> >> >> >>>On Mon, 7 Feb 2005, Steve Simmons wrote: >>> >>>What's the latest thinking on the degree of justification of >>>the fire bombing of Tokyo/the nuking of Hiroshima/ditto Nagasaki? >>>Last I heard there were questions about whether the latter >>>were in part a message to Stalin, and (switching to my speculation) >>>that in fact a reason to finish off the Pacific war asap was to keep >>>him out of Japan. >>> >>> >>As I recall, the original justification for the firebombing of Tokyo was >>that the Japanese industry was spread throughout many small "home" >>workshops, making the type of directed attack used against the German >>industry useless. Of course, I haven't studied this in detail for over 15 >>years, so there may be some information I have forgotten. As far as the >>atomic bombs, well, I think it was multifaceted, a message to Stalin and a >>way to finish the war quickly. 1.6 million estimated US casualties if the >>home islands were invaded is the number that pops into my head, and that was >>based on the nasty island hopping fighting done on the way to Japan. Also, >>until you have seen the devestation that they wrecked upon a city, you can >>not comprehend how devestating those weapons are, regardless of how many >>films you have seen of them expolding in the desert. >> >> >When considering the use of nuclear weapons, one needs to bear in mind >that those making the decision didn't understand the long-term issues of >fallout, the effect of the flash, etc, etc. They certianly expected >something similar to the firebombing, tho, and the intent was exactly to >cause the 'indiscrimate' destruction which resulted. > > The Nagasaki bomb was different in design from the Hiroshima bomb. There is some evidence that planners deliberately went ahead with that mission because they wanted to study the difference in the effects of the bombs & in the way they were employed. I don't think anyone has found a smoking gun to that effect, but if true it was a pretty despicable act. >The book >is flawed, but will tell you in chilling detail the intensity of the >Japanese resistance. . . . There was every reason to expect that taking >Japan itself would be harder, both on the US soldier and on the Japanese. > >The most common counter-arguement is that the Japanese were ready >to surrender. There were certianly some Japanese officials who were >sounding out the US about the possibility of same, but it wasn't clear >then or now just how influential they were. As a counter-example, >bear in mind that there were individuals in the Japanese military who >considered assasinating the Emperor rather than surrender -- and that >was *after* the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were dropped. > > > Actually it is quite clear who these officials were: it was the Japanese war cabinet discussing the possibility among itself (& disagreeing violently). There's no way to know how the debate would have ultimately gone nor how long it would have taken, but the fact that in a culture of conformity dissent was raised at all & at such a high level is significant, I feel. But balanced against that is the fact that the die-hards still had significant support & probably would have controlled things. For a while, anyways. Also to be considered is that the Japanese had made peace overtures through the Soviets & had replied to messages from the US--but the Soviets didn't pass back the Japanese answers because Stalin wanted to keep the war going long enough to transfer troops to the east & invade Manchuria & China. The US naturally assumed the Japanese wern't interested. It's also the case that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on the heels of Hiroshima carried more weight with the cabinet than Hiroshima. Right about the time the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the Japanese position in Manchuria had collapsed beyond any possibility of rescue--this after only 48 hours. It looked to the Japanese as if they would lose all of China in a few weeks at that rate--and the majority of their armies & all of their elite troops were in China. Nor could they have returned them to the home islands, because intense mine and submarine warfare since the early spring of '45 had totally cut off Japanese naval & transport traffic. Even ships hugging the coast or proceding through the Inland Waterway could travel only slowly, with the greatest of difficulty, and with severe losses. Mines alone, employed mostly in '45, amounted to 22% of shipping losses in the entire war for the Japanese. The original estimate was for 250,000 *casualties* for an invasion. Somewhere along the way up the chain of command, that got translated to 250,000 *killed* & therefore, 1,000,000 total casualties. No one now seems to be able to work out how the estimate was made, how it was miscommunicated, & how it got changed. As a ballpark figure, the first estimate isn't unreasonable, but the later one is. Bear in mind that only secondary troops, ill-equipped & ill-trained, were in Japan itself. Bear in mind, too, that Japan was rapidly starving to death as a result of the naval campaigns mentioned above. It isn't clear that resistance could have even continued to '46. Which is more or less what the Strategic Bombing Survey concluded when it went into Japan in the fall of '45--that an invasion would never have been necessary. The point may be arguable, but anyone doing so is working from the disadvantage that the SBS were professionals on the ground at the time whereas none of us can say the same (most likely, unless any of you are BDA experts (-: ). Finally, Teller (hardly a wishy washy revisionist liberal!) after many years of maintaining the correctness of the decision to bomb Hiroshima eventually changed his mind & wished that he had instead argued for a "test" blast near Tokyo. I forget whether his idea was a nighttime air burst, far enough out to do little damage, but enough to impress the eveyone with the sight of a miniature sun in their nighttime sky, or a day blast in Tokyo Bay, but either proposition would have been more convincing on the cabinet since they would actually have been able to *see* what 1 bomb could do, upfront and personal. (It took nearly 24 hours for any coherent account of what happened at Hiroshima to get back to them; they had to send someone by train to take a look for himself & bring back photos, & that took hours, given the wrecked nature of communications across the island.) The upshot is we aren't ever going to know and you aren't ever going to convince any veteran of the Pacific war that it was other than wise to bomb. My own take is that the first bombing was debatable but understandable, that the second bombing so close on the heels of the first was wrong, and that a demonstration blast near to Tokyo would have made more sense in any case. I certainly don't buy the idea that the bomb alone caused the Japanese to surrender, because there was too much else going on at the time; it's possible, but I don't see how you can prove it. Snarkhunter